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Abstract This article aims to open up the biographical black box of three experts
working in the boundary zone between science, policy and public debate. A bio-
graphical-narrative approach is used to analyse the roles played by the virologists
Albert Osterhaus, Roel Coutinho and Jaap Goudsmit in policy and public debate.
These ﬁgures were among the few leading virologists visibly active in the Neth-
erlands during the revival of infectious diseases in the 1980s. Osterhaus and
Coutinho in particular are still the key ﬁgures today, as demonstrated during the
outbreak of novel inﬂuenza A (H1N1). This article studies the various political and
communicative challenges and dilemmas encountered by these three virologists,
and discusses the way in which, strategically or not, they handled those challenges
and dilemmas during the various stages of the ﬁeld’s recent history. Important in
this respect is their pursuit of a public role that is both effective and credible. We
will conclude with a reﬂection on the H1N1 pandemic, and the historical and
biographical ties between emerging governance arrangements and the experts
involved in the development of such arrangements.
Keywords Experts  Virology  Policy development  Public communication 
Biographical-narrative method
Introduction
With the recent outbreak of novel inﬂuenza A (H1N1), better known as swine ﬂu,
familiar faces became even more familiar. In the Netherlands, the experts who not
only frequently informed the public and investigated the virus, but also predicted the
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DOI 10.1007/s11024-010-9145-zpandemic’s course and handled public health policy problems, were ﬁgures that had
assumed this role ever since the ‘revival’ of infectious diseases in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. The general public, politicians, journalists and sceptics alike were
already familiar with their names and faces, reputations and views, and even with
their tactics and styles of handling such affairs.
This article is about these actors. I have studied the way in which three Dutch
virologists, Albert Osterhaus, Roel Coutinho and Jaap Goudsmit, became both
prominent and visible experts, and how they dealt with the various challenges
entailed by such a role. This article uses a biographical-narrative approach to
analyse their advancement into public and policy experts on infectious diseases,
against the backdrop of the broader developments in Dutch policy and society.
In this article, the genesis of the visible expert (visible for policymakers, the
media and the general public) is studied on an individual or micro-level by
examining a number of stages between the late 1970s and the present day. Although
textual sources (media coverage, policy reports and so on) are used as a backdrop
and frame of reference, the basic source of input for my study is a series of narrative
interviews with the experts themselves. Before turning to the case study as such, I
will outline the theoretical and methodological framework of my research. I will
also place biographical research in the broader ﬁeld of science studies and discuss
the methodological opportunities and risks involved in such an approach.
Looking at and Acting on the Science-Policy-Public Boundaries
In science studies the science-policy nexus has been extensively studied by looking
at boundary organisations (viz. Jasanoff 1990; Guston 1999; Bijker et al. 2009;
Huitema and Turnhout 2009), at the role of experts in policy development (Rutgers
and Mentzel 1999; Nowotny 2000; Hoppe 2005, 2009; Turnhout et al. 2008) and at
policy cultures, or their absence (Hellstro ¨m 2000; Halffman and Hoppe 2005;
Halffman 2005). In this context, a biographical approach has two major advantages.
First of all, a biographical approach allows us to study the individual views of the
experts themselves and the assessments of their own roles. Secondly, a biographical
approach allows us to ﬂesh out the relationship between experts, policymaking and
public communication.
The views of experts working in close interaction with policymaking and the
public sphere have been extensively studied. Hoppe, for instance, described the
views of scientiﬁc experts as boundary workers, and discerned several ways of
looking at the science-policy boundary (Hoppe 2009). Huitema and Turnhout
(2009) focus on the institutional level and describe the ‘political’ roles of experts
working in a Dutch boundary organisation. Claire Waterton (2005) also focused on
the science-politics boundary, in particular in the ﬁeld of research policy and
funding. Together with Sarah Davies (2008), who describes the views held by
scientists regarding the science-public boundary, these authors analyse the outlooks
of individual scientists working across the boundaries of their organisations and
disciplines. One of the challenges of discussing the views of scientists in the
science-policy and science-public zones is to point out how each of the experts
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creating an identity for themselves in the process.
In light of the ‘Third Wave’ debate on expertise (see Collins and Evans 2002;
Collins and Evans 2007; Wynne 1992, 2003), a distinction can be made between a
‘relational’ versus a ‘realistic’ view on expertise. In this paper we will look at the
experts and their expertise from a relational or social role perspective (Collins and
Evans 2007, p. 2). We treat the role of experts not as a given solid state, but as
something in ﬂux. This ﬂux is the net result of interactions between the actions of
individuals, and the attributing of trust and credibility by others (viz. Goffman 1959,
pp. 15–16; Wynne 1992, p. 282; Huitema and Turnhout 2009, p. 579), turning the
experts into ‘hybrid characters’ (Daston and Sibum 2003). A role in this
understanding cannot be attributed solely to what the individual expert wants.
Roles are contingent outcomes of these interactions, in which trust and credibility
play a crucial part.
This article studies these interactions under speciﬁc circumstances, i.e. during
moments of crisis. Crises as focusing events challenge experts to inform and
comment on the crisis, to assist in the development of appropriate policies, and
more generally to sketch the prospects of where the crisis is heading (Birkland
1997). Understood as such, we will see how crises function as springboards for
experts from relative invisibility to visibility, and how experts are thus invited or
forced to develop their own style of crisis management. Some authors point to the
strategic use of crises in inducing policy change (Kingdon 1995; Birkland 1997;
Weingart et al. 2000). These sources demonstrate that a crisis is not something that
‘just happens’ to experts, but that experts, as policy entrepreneurs, also shape and
give voice to crises. They tend to use moments of crises to ‘capture attention for
their causes’, at times even by ‘overselling to the media’ (Weingart 1999, p. 159;
see also Edwards 1999, p. 169).
In the expert narratives we will see how perceptions of science, policy and public
boundaries, and strategic ways of acting on the boundaries, are viewed from a
biographical perspective. This shows the developments, the challenges and crises
that experts engage with, and the learning experiences of ‘being an expert’. It opens
up the biographical ‘black box’ of experts in policymaking and public debate.
A Biographical-Narrative Approach: Narratives in Action
The biographical-narrative approach has been gaining ground in the areas of science
studies and social sciences (Shortland and Yeo 1996; Huisman et al. 2000; Plummer
2001). We ﬁnd examples of this approach in anthropological laboratory studies
(Traweek 1988), feminist studies of science (Abir-Am and Outram 1987), the
sociology of science (Zuckerman 1977; Goodell 1977; Kissmann 2007), the history
of science (Porter 2006; Nye 2006; Terrall 2006) and the epistemology of science
(Zwart 2008). The biographical-narrative method used here combines social–
historical studies and narrative analysis, and provides an idiographic view on
expertise in the form of ‘expert narratives’. To produce these narratives, data from
various types and sources were ordered around a speciﬁc ‘plot’ or thematic thread
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into experts on policy and the public domain.
The inductive development of narratives involved four iterative stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, data were collected on the academic and public track records of the three
virologists, and on the socio-historical context of infectious diseases in which these
virologists were situated. This was used to prepare biographical-narrative
interviews,
1 the second step. These interviews focused on their experiences in
policymaking and public debate. The experts also commented on each other in these
interviews. The third step was to organise the data temporally, hereby focusing on
the diachronic data (data on events, their relations and the effects of events). This
step included the collection of additional data, for example by conducting a second
round of interviews. In the ﬁnal stage, the expert careers were written down as
coherent and empirically-grounded narratives, thereby ‘explicating an intrinsically
meaningful form’ (Polkinghorne 2005, p. 93).
Rather than being the only true reconstruction of past experiences and events, the
narratives constitute one possible approach to ordering them coherently. The labels
used to structure these narratives must likewise be seen as provisional headings. As
to the methodological validity of the narratives that emerge in this manner, it is
important to see that the production process of narratives takes place on various
levels. The ﬁrst level is the level of the actual events as experienced by the experts
involved, the so-called lived story (Rosenthal 2005, p. 27; Wengraf 2000).
Subsequently the experts themselves will reﬂect on these events retrospectively and
from a certain distance. This level can be referred to as the told story. Finally, as a
result of the interactions, post hoc reﬂections and reframings between interviewee
and researcher,
2 the written story as a third level of narrative emerges
3 (Littig 2008,
par. 17). Thus, the written story builds on the two previous levels, and care is taken
to secure the internal validity through iterative data collecting and interview
sessions, as is also the case here.
Moreover, the written story also feeds back into the previous levels and shapes
the lived story. Narrating is a way of constructing ones identity (Brockmeier and
Carbaugh 2001, p. 15; Bruner 2001, pp. 34–35). In the course of constructing a
‘front region’ narrative, the identities the virologists assume as experts shape their
actions and interventions, allowing them to present themselves in a way they ﬁnd
desirable (Goffman 1959). Narratives not only constrain, they also enable action
(Deuten and Rip 2000, p. 72). By being involved in narrative processes in
biographical-narrative interviews, and by intervening in the identity constructions,
one actually comes closer to the lived story.
1 Interviews with experts or elites differ remarkably from other kinds of interviews; for a brief discussion
see Beate Littig (2008).
2 In this paper I unfortunately cannot illustrate this dimension with a structural analysis of the narratives.
For reasons of space I therefore limit myself to a thematic analysis (see Riessman 2008, chapters 3–4).
3 The virologists themselves also produce written narratives on their roles, creating fascinating
comparative research material on narrativity and identity (see Goudsmit 2009; Coutinho 2 February
2010).
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Before turning to the actual expert narratives, I will give a brief overview of the
main Dutch institutes and their functions, the institutional landscape as it were. The
Ministries of Health and of Agriculture are the two major policymaking bodies in
the domain of infectious diseases, while local (Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdiensten,
GGD) and national (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu, RIVM) public
health institutes have an executive task. University Medical Centres (UMCs) play a
more independent role. A central advisory body is the Dutch Health Council
(Gezondheidsraad, GR). The Health Council is an advisory body that presents the
‘state of affairs’ of science, and explicitly advises policy, it does not make it
(Interview Knottnerus & De Visser. 30 January 2006; Bijker et al. 2009). In 2005,
the Centre for Infectious Disease Control was established as a specialised body for
scientiﬁc advice and outbreak control, emerging as a new boundary organisation in
the Dutch institutional landscape (CIDC, see Ministry of Health 7 December 2004).
The Dutch advisory sector for infectious diseases can thus be characterised as a
‘corporatist policy arrangement’, with a restricted and formally accredited set of
experts that act on personal title (Halffman and Hoppe 2005, p. 137; Bijker et al.
2009, pp. 85–86). On an international level we ﬁnd the European Scientiﬁc Working
Group on Inﬂuenza (ESWI), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) and of course the World Health Organization (WHO).
This landscape constitutes the backdrop for the three biographical narratives.
Osterhaus started his career as a veterinarian at the RIVM (1978) and went to
Rotterdam UMC in 1994. Coutinho worked at the Amsterdam GGD from 1977 until
2005, after which he moved to the CIDC. He has always been afﬁliated with the
Amsterdam Medical Centre (AMC). Goudsmit also spent much of his career at the
AMC; in 2002 he joined Crucell, a Dutch biotech vaccine company.
Stages of Crisis and Control
In discussing the expert narratives, we divide the ﬁeld of virology into a number of
stages. Roughly, we identify ﬁve stages, based on the alternation of times of crisis
and of control.
1. Late 1970s: The end of infectious diseases: controlling the known enemies
2. 1982–1993: First crisis in virology
3. 1993–1997: Reaching relative stability: controlling the current crisis
4. 1997–2003: Second crisis in virology
5. 2003–April 2009
4: Anticipating future crises
Towards the end of the 1970s, infectious diseases were a dull ﬁeld of science, on
the verge of extinction in a world that knew soap and sewers, vaccines and
4 This study ends just before the novel inﬂuenza A (H1N1) pandemic, to which we will turn in the
conclusion.
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into viral oncology where public stakes were low (Van der Noordaa 7 May 2008).
Then, all of a sudden in 1982, HIV/Aids emerged as an unknown enemy in the
Dutch gay scene. It constituted a challenge and problem for human virology,
accompanied by a sudden inﬂux of research funding, public concern and policy
development.
5 Furthermore, there was an aggressive viral outbreak in seals in the
North and Baltic Seas around 1988, which killed tens of thousands of seals. BSE
was seen just before this, putting veterinary virology ﬁrmly on the map and
introducing virologists into the midst of political and public debate. As it turned out,
these crises were a springboard to visibility for the three virologists studied here.
At the start of the 1990s, these crises had more or less been brought under
control. The causal agents were discovered and the era saw the development and
implementation of policies in routine veterinary and human healthcare practices.
The HIV/Aids epidemic stabilised in the Netherlands and government interest in
infectious diseases decreased. This stability would last until 1997, when new
infectious threats suddenly emerged. For the virologists this was a moment to once
again assume visibility in public debate and involvement in policy development.
The ﬁrst H5N1 deaths marked the advent of a second crisis. Besides fears of an
avian inﬂuenza pandemic, scientists and politicians were concerned about the
growing threat of bioterrorism and outbreaks of foot and mouth disease. Finally, the
outbreak of SARS in 2003 came as a complete surprise. It was SARS that
highlighted the real danger of pandemic outbreaks, but that also triggered the
awareness of preparedness and prevention plans as new instruments in preventing a
pandemic from developing to its full capacity (Osterhaus 6 March 2009).
Stage 1: Late 1970s: Controlling the Known Enemies
Towards the end of this period of declining public and political need for virologists,
all three virology experts completed their studies. Their careers were to become
heavily intertwined with the events that followed; they had positioned themselves in
such a way that, unaware of future challenges, their involvement with policy and the
media during the ﬁrst crisis was evident.
Stage 2: 1982–1993: First Crisis in Virology
Ab Osterhaus: The Strategic Scientist
Although Osterhaus had been in the media since 1978 (on the death of dogs at the
worlddogshow),hisstoryreallybeginsin1985withBovineSpongiformEncephalitis
(BSE). In the early years, no one believed BSE could become a human pathogen;
5 Of course, the use of the name HIV/Aids here is ahistorical since many other names and abbreviations
circulated in the early years, see Shilts (1987). The First Dutch HIV/Aids death was reported in the spring
of 1982 (see also Mooij 2004; Andere tijden 26 November 2002).
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6 However, Osterhaus
suspected it could indeed become a human pathogen, and in 1988 he pursued it to the
EU policymaking arena with backing from his director. As chairman of the EEC
Scientiﬁc Veterinary Committee he acted cautiously. Nevertheless, he met with
scepticism,sincepointingoutthepossiblepublichealthdangerswentagainstthegrain
of policymakers. He did not refrain from setting policy machinery in motion, and a
proposal for legislation on the various dangers of BSE was issued almost monthly. In
his opinion, this had its effect on policy processes (Osterhaus 29 July 2008).
In 1988, he became more visible to the general public with the dramatic death of
seals in the North Sea.
7 Osterhaus was called in to investigate these deaths, and
discovered that the seals had died of a previously unknown virus. However,
Greenpeace opposed his conclusion: they were convinced that pollution or poisonous
algaehadcausedthefatalities,sincethisﬁttedtheirownobjectives.Thisdisagreement
with the environmentalists challenged Osterhaus to prove he was right, and he
conducted extensive experiments with seals. To his surprise these studies did identify
pollutionasacontributingfactorintheseals’deaths,butasanindirectcausalfactor:it
made them less resistant. Osterhaus considered this a success: he had discredited his
own hypothesis and discovered a causal chain more nuanced than either he himself or
Greenpeace had expected (Osterhaus 6 March 2008). The research on seal death, that
started in 1985 and has continued ever since, has had an enormous impact on several
aspectsofOsterhaus’career.ItdeliveredhimhisﬁrstfourNaturepublicationsin1988
and 1989, and many other papers followed. His reputation grew, and the conﬂict with
Greenpeacepulledhimintopoliticalandpublicdebates.Duetothesealdeathresearch
he also became scientiﬁc advisor to a national seal shelter.
The controversies surrounding BSE and the seal deaths show two aspects of
Osterhaus’ role. He was self-conﬁdent in his estimations about risks, but also
acknowledged criticism from his sceptics. The tricky question was when to stick to
his original position, and when to adopt the opposing view, and, consequently, the
appropriate strategy. This, he says, created a tension: on the one hand he had his
own gut feelings, and at the same time he tried to think through competing
viewpoints. There was not only an epistemological choice to be made, but also a
balancing act to carry out: considering various interests and health threats. We will
characterise his role as that of the strategic scientist: someone who carefully
balances different viewpoints and forms of evidence, but who also has the strategic
skills and will to further his own case.
Roel Coutinho: From Critical to Controversial Collaborator
Of the three virologists studied here, Coutinho’s role was the one shaped the most
by the nature of his research and the positions he held. As a public health director in
6 All translations of interview quotes and quotes from Dutch newspapers were made by the author, and
where possible corrected for errors.
7 He often tells this story. I heard it during a master class he gave (29 November 2007), and newspaper
articles often mention it. The master class also showed how he weaves science and personal narratives
together into one story.
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homosexuals and intravenous drug users, it was obvious he would be involved in
dealing with HIV/Aids, and he was very motivated to do so.
In 1984, Coutinho, Goudsmit and their superior, Jan van der Noordaa, initiated
the Amsterdam Cohort Studies (ACS)
8 on HIV/AIDS, and began testing a cohort of
homosexual men. The results were alarming: 30% of the participating 750
homosexuals were infected with HIV, revealing an urgent public health issue.
However, as homosexuals were in a process of emancipation, they feared
discrimination and blame for bringing HIV/Aids into the world. Disease prevention
did not outweigh this concern. Since Coutinho saw that both homosexuals and drug
users tended not to take the danger of infection seriously (as they had previously
done with venereal diseases), he used the statistics to make them aware of the scale
and nature of the epidemic. His rationale was that without being open about a
problem, one cannot start solving it. Also, covering up the truth implies a disdain for
society and is likely to result in a loss of credibility (Coutinho 13 May 2008; Mooij
2004; Andere tijden 26 November 2002).
Although a sound approach for Coutinho, it met with substantial opposition on
various fronts. Indeed, the slightest hint towards the identiﬁcation of homosexuals
as a risk group made them revolt; and to Coutinho’s dismay the national government
gave equal weight to the control of HIV and the prevention of discrimination. A
chasm emerged between scientiﬁc and socio-political realities,
9 but one that could
be handled within the National Committee on AIDS Control (NCAB) to which he
belonged.
10
If the scientists were taken by surprise by the HIV/Aids epidemic, then the media
were even more so. They desperately needed information, and Coutinho and other
members of the NCAB were in a position to virtually control the coverage of HIV/
Aids (Mooij 2004, p. 21). By doing so they also inﬂuenced policy (Coutinho 13 May
2008), since politics, especially in those days, was very susceptible to public
opinion.
Despite this chasm, in the beginning he perceived and experienced the
collaboration with homosexuals as ‘extremely good, very constructive and also
very useful’ (Coutinho 25 July 2008). But tensions increased as time progressed:
HIV/Aids spread, the number of parties involved increased and the decision-making
structure grew more complex. From 1986 onwards, when a new information
campaign was launched, Coutinho’s critical, factual, and open attitude was too
problematic for those working with him; he openly stated that the campaign masked
the fact that homosexuals were a distinct risk population (Coutinho 25 July 2008).
Following this criticism, the productive working relationship with the gay
community started to crumble.
On two occasions in 1989 the tensions between Coutinho, homosexuals and
politics culminated in conﬂict. A clash with politics came when the Secretary of
8 Still ongoing, see http://www.amsterdamcohortstudies.org/ (accessed 8 Dec 2009).
9 This chasm was not uniquely Dutch, but a feature of the early HIV/Aids years in all countries.
10 Since 1987: National Committee on AIDS Control. The change from ‘coordinating’ to ‘controlling’
HIV/Aids is a remarkable one, airing an increased demand for control over the epidemic.
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authors, openly mocked the Secretary and he was brought to account. Although this
was an unpleasant experience, Coutinho said he would do the same again (Coutinho
13 May 2008). And so he did. Later that year he was appointed professor, and in his
inaugural lecture he surprised friend and foe by again criticising the HIV/Aids
communication policy of the NCAB. Members of the NCAB and of the gay
community were outraged: how could someone like Coutinho threaten the societal
position of homosexual men? Coutinho was forced to step down from the NCAB.
But how dramatic was his departure? The information campaigns were up and
running (if not without some hiccups), a policy framework was in place and
‘personal relations were ﬁne’ (Coutinho 25 July 2008); he actually felt relieved to be
out of the NCAB.
Coutinho’s role during this stage started out as critical collaborator, and it
shifted to controversial collaborator after 1986: he was very outspoken, stubborn,
did not negotiate with others on the contributions he made to the media, and he did
not let himself be tamed by the sensitivities of gay emancipation. He described this
period as being jammed between science and policy.
11 The collaboration in the
control of HIV/Aids became gradually more problematic, which resulted in this shift
in Coutinho’s role.
Jaap Goudsmit: The Hubristic Expert
Goudsmit’s role contrasts those of Coutinho and Osterhaus. He was not heavily
involved in the development of health policy frameworks or legislation, as his
sphere of activity was more limited to public debates. These debates included the
debate on gay blood donors and on the origins of AIDS. When invited to reﬂect on
the 1980s during interviews, he did not recount speciﬁc moments, but rather gave a
general impression of his contacts with the media. What dominated was the sense of
losing control over his utterances in the media, and this had a lasting inﬂuence on
Goudsmit’s attitude towards the media (Goudsmit 2 April 2008).
One event in the expert development of Jaap Goudsmit, which gradually takes us
to the end of the second stage, is an affair that shocked many: the Buck-Goudsmit
affair.
12 Early in 1990 Henk Buck, a professor of chemistry, wanted to check
whether a DNA drug he had discovered could work on HIV. Goudsmit therefore ran
tests with the substance, and mistakenly conﬁrmed that it worked. A letter was sent
to Science and Buck and Goudsmit held an ofﬁcial press conference. This was, after
all, a discovery of great importance.
The positive atmosphere turned bleak when Buck started making claims that
went beyond the original signiﬁcance of the discovery, promising a cure within a
few years. People were outraged, since HIV/Aids patients were given false hope.
While Buck himself was scapegoated, Goudsmit got away, but not entirely
untouched. The drama affected him, and he became more reluctant when called on
as an expert and more cautious when in contact with the media (Goudsmit 2 April
11 Every time he spoke about this, he made a wrenching gesture with his hands.
12 See (Hagendijk and Meeus 1993; Eijgenraam 1991; Andere tijden 29 November 2005).
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the AMC; and when three years later Science announced him as Europe’s most
important HIV/Aids researcher (Cohen 1993) the Buck-Goudsmit affair was not
mentioned at all.
During the second interview Goudsmit described his 1980s self as a hubristic
expert (Goudsmit 19 May 2008), and other sources support that view: someone who
is very conﬁdent about his knowledge base. This stage of his career involves
frequent loss of control over statements and quotes: being tempted by journalists to
utter sweeping statements and daring analyses. Analysing the interviews with
Goudsmit, we ﬁnd two interrelated problems for the hubristic expert. The ﬁrst is a
lack of experience in controlling the media; the second is a lack of knowledge of the
limits to his expertise. As we will see, a gradual shift in both these aspects later in
his career would change his role.
Stage 3: 1993–1997: Reaching Relative Stability: Controlling
the Current Crisis
In 1993, some 10 years after the ﬁrst Dutch cases of HIV/Aids, the epidemic
stabilised, a partial indication that the expert community had gained relative control
over the situation. The general implications were that HIV/Aids became less
newsworthy, which of course had implications for the roles of the scientiﬁc experts,
in particular Roel Coutinho. Transformation is a recurring theme in this third stage:
positions, whether in a political, institutional, public or epistemological sense,
changed, and the role of our experts changed accordingly.
Ab Osterhaus: The Prophet of Doom
Osterhaus experienced a number of changes that were to make him even more
visible than before. An important change in this respect is that of occupational
context. In 1994, he left the RIVM, ‘the institute that muzzled him’ (Osterhaus 29
July 2008), when he refused to end his seal research (NRC Handelsblad 14 April
2003). He and his staff moved to the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, where
he still holds a position.
This change from a muzzling institute to a university that was not familiar with
‘ministerial responsibility’ liberated him in his role as public expert; and with this
change a second came along: he became director of the WHO National Inﬂuenza
Centre. Inﬂuenza appeared on his radar screen and Osterhaus became interested in
past inﬂuenza pandemics. He then became chairman of the European Scientiﬁc
Working group on Inﬂuenza, the ESWI. On a more personal note, being struck by
inﬂuenza himself made him experience the severity of ﬂu. These personal,
professional and scientiﬁc experiences with ﬂu would from now on become a
dominant factor in his contact with policy and the media (Osterhaus 29 July 2008).
In 1995, he made some initial, cautious remarks that hinted at the lurking threat of
inﬂuenza (Trouw 17 February 1995). But in 1997 the cautiousness gave way to a
154 E. van Rijswoud
123much more alarming message when the ﬁrst human bird ﬂu casualty was reported
(Osterhaus 6 March 2008). Osterhaus and others wrote a letter to Nature entitled A
Pandemic Warning (De Jong et al. 1997), in which they referred to H5N1 as a virus
with ‘unknown pandemic potential’. A few months later he would be more
straightforward in a Dutch newspaper, saying that ‘a future pandemic ﬂu on the
scale of the 1918 Spanish Flu was not unimaginable’ (Algemeen Dagblad 30
December 1997).
The ﬂu deaths were to trigger the second crisis in the recent history of virology.
In contrast to the ﬁrst crisis, when the virologists were taken by surprise, Osterhaus
became the advocate of awareness of and preparation for inﬂuenza. From now on, a
discursive strategy announcing the coming pandemic was aired in public media and
in policymaking, using the pandemic warning as an instrument to create awareness
and a policy forum (Parool 26 April 2001). This led to the charge from politicians
and colleagues of being a prophet of doom (Osterhaus 6 March 2008), which marks
the role he had during this stage.
Roel Coutinho: An Expert’s Hibernation
Although not of his own bidding, Coutinho’s preoccupation with policymaking and
the media decreased signiﬁcantly after 1992. A quite visible expert began to
hibernate. He felt content with these developments since he had become worn out
with endless debates in committees and with telling the same stories to the media
over and over again. Expert hibernation in this sense does not mean he was entirely
absent in the media or in policymaking, but compared to the preceding and
following periods there was a signiﬁcant decrease of exposure. There is one event,
however, which demonstrates his view as an expert on health problems. After a
decline in HIV/Aids cases in 1993, he later reported the epidemic to be far from
over, and stated how he thought the problem should be prevented: ‘It makes a huge
difference when you get the problem out in the open’ (Trouw 5 December 1998).
This strategy was put to the test during the 1980s, and it passed. He says that it has
been the key to his expert policy and still is today.
Jaap Goudsmit: Vaccine Research Taming the Hubris
Goudsmit’s role also changed during this stage. Although at the end of the second
stage he was recovering from the Buck-Goudsmit affair, in retrospect he claims the
whole affair did not fundamentally change his ideas on how to be an expert.
The two processes that we identiﬁed earlier—learning to control the media and
becoming more aware of his knowledge base—are drawn to a close at the mid-
1990s by the realities of vaccine research. In 1990, Goudsmit and Osterhaus
received funding to develop a candidate HIV vaccine. In 1992, the former was very
conﬁdent about the prospects for such a vaccine (Trouw 24 March 1992); but just
two years later we see a mixed attitude: Goudsmit is still optimistic regarding the
possibilities of a vaccine, although he thinks that it will require international
coordination and prolonged collaboration (Parool 26 March 1994). That is what he
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International Aids Vaccine Initiative. In the meantime, the joint project with
Osterhaus fails, in part because they ‘entirely underestimated the difﬁculties in
developing a vaccine’ (Goudsmit in Mooij 2004, p. 164). Goudsmit is currently still
active in the development of vaccines, but his prospects for an HIV vaccine are
sombre (NRC Handelsblad 1 December 2007; Goudsmit 19 May 2008). In
Goudsmit’s own words, the hubristic expert discovered that he was not that
knowledgeable at all, that despite all his knowledge about HIV he could not produce
a vaccine. This is what in effect changed the way in which he performs as an expert
in public. As he became painfully aware of the limits of his expertise, Goudsmit
changed into an expert who wants to be in strict control of what to say, when, where
and to whom (Goudsmit 2 April 2008).
Stage 4: 1997–2003: Second Crisis in Virology
It was during this stage that Osterhaus incited awareness of a potential pandemic.
He became a key ﬁgure in the Dutch, European and WHO pandemic preparedness
plans, and he aired his pandemic warning ever more frequently and urgently, acting
as a catalyst for policymakers. But other threats, such as the threat of bioterrorism
(Gezondheidsraad 2001, 2002), foot and mouth, and later SARS, were also posing
challenges for virologists. The greatest fears were, and still are, zoonoses: animal
viruses that evolve into human pathogens (Gezondheidsraad 2005). Collectively,
this amounted to the second crisis.
Ab Osterhaus: The Entangled Expert
Following the H5N1 deaths in 1997, Osterhaus unfolded a scenario that matched his
earlier response to BSE. Virologists, including Osterhaus, urged the WHO to
develop pandemic preparedness plans, which was done instantly. In an individual
capacity, he then initiated a meeting to discuss the appropriate policy responses for
Europe. Besides him initiating the meeting, it is interesting to see how he organised
this meeting and steered its outcomes.
Osterhaus was a well-known and respected ﬁgure in the European health policy
scene, belonging to some of the key scientiﬁc or health care committees. A ﬁrst
move he made when organising the 1998 meeting was to hand it over to an EU civil
servant, now the meeting’s captain. The civil servant would take credit for this
meeting, and it would also be political. The second move was to select the
participants, including the responsible EU commissioner and a range of inﬂuential
virologists. By selecting the participants himself, Osterhaus brought together a
speciﬁc body of political power and scientiﬁc expertise; and he managed to
orchestrate the political process in a direction he deemed optimal without drawing
attention to himself. Osterhaus strategically translated his pandemic warning into an
ofﬁcial and visible EU committee.
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have had three pandemic outbreaks of inﬂuenza, in 1918, 1957 and 1968, killing
some 100 million civilians. We can be sure a new pandemic will arrive, and unless
we take appropriate measures, hundreds of thousands will die’. Although the
pandemic warning was a policy lubricant (Parool 26 April 2001), Osterhaus
believed in the reality of this message and he says it was a plain technical
assessment (Osterhaus 6 March 2008). His colleagues, however, believed the
message to be an overstatement, bordering on lobbying for research funds (Coutinho
13 May 2008; Goudsmit 2 April 2008, 19 May 2008; Van der Noordaa 7 May
2008). They also say that Osterhaus’ tone has tempered over the years, perhaps
because the discursive strategy has had its desired effects, perhaps because the
scientiﬁc reality has changed.
13
This tension between his own scientiﬁc gut feeling and the scepticism of his
critics is a dilemma he dubbed the ‘cry wolf dilemma’. This ‘visionary virologist’
had to perform a balancing act between two extremes: on the one hand the credible
but reticent academic, on the other hand the ‘incredible fool’ (Osterhaus 6 March
2008); and the longer it took for a pandemic to strike, the more his credibility would
be at stake.
His public appearances became numerous as the concerns over bioterrorism,
inﬂuenza, bird ﬂu and SARS increased, and as the Dutch government neglected
public communication. The media’s solution to this latter problem was straight-
forward: call Osterhaus. He is always willing to spare a moment since he believes
science communication is part of a scientist’s professional ethos (Osterhaus 6 March
2008). These appearances amounted to a clear media policy with a handful of tricks
to safeguard his public credibility.
It was not only the media who sought his assistance. In the midst of the BSE
outbreak of 2000, Osterhaus was also asked to personally advise the Minister of
Agriculture, who appeared to be ill-informed by his own staff. That same afternoon,
the minister informed Parliament of his BSE policy. Osterhaus heard the same
sentences he had spoken that morning, and in the interview says he felt relieved:
‘Democracy was still able to function as it should’ (Osterhaus 6 March 2008). Civil
servants lack the expertise to make informed decisions and they need experts to give
advice, even if that means importing their political agenda.
2003 was a busy year for virology, but especially for Osterhaus. In addition to his
professorship and his extensive policy work, both avian ﬂu and SARS struck in the
spring of that year. He became involved in both of them. One moment that
Osterhaus especially recalls regarding avian ﬂu is a meeting of the Outbreak
Management Team (OMT) to determine the necessary policy. The majority opposed
Osterhaus’ policy view, and rather than conforming, he tried to enforce his view by
threatening them with a minority point of view, sketching what might happen
should the OMT abstain from following his advice. It proved effective, but also
demonstrated the fragility of his position: had he not been there, policy would have
been very different (Osterhaus 6 March 2008).
13 This was before the H1N1 pandemic; the pandemic warning gained force with H1N1.
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direction of the WHO a small selection of laboratories, including Osterhaus’ own
lab in Rotterdam, were on the hunt for the cause; and on 16 April 2003 the
Osterhaus lab managed to ﬁnd the ﬁnal and most rewarding piece of the puzzle. A
press meeting was held at the WHO Geneva headquarters that same afternoon; a
letter in Nature (Fouchier et al. 2003) and a royal decoration followed. Osterhaus
reaped the rewards for the discovery and his status rose (Enserink 2003). But what is
more: the WHO prevented a pandemic. This marks the SARS crisis as a moment
when virologists could control a crisis. Osterhaus himself noticed that his
credibility, authority and power in science, politics and society rocketed.
However, the various cases he narrated illustrate the strategic position Osterhaus
held, a position that slowly became problematic. The many ‘hats’ he wore and
responsibilities he carried, both nationally and internationally, confounded his
expert role. He says it was manageable to know when to speak from which position
and responsibility, but outsiders saw this same person in quite different settings,
taking up both scientiﬁc and political roles in one same interview (see for example
Netwerk 21 February 2003). Other virologists noted that he was doing the
government’s dirty work (Osterhaus 29 July 2008; Goudsmit in NRC Handelsblad 5
July 2003), and even a ministerial letter to parliament had to justify the way
Osterhaus’ view was accommodated in policy (Veerman 23-04-2003). In the second
crisis, Osterhaus had scientiﬁc credibility and political responsibilities, he made
scientiﬁc and strategic statements, and he spoke in both a personal and collective
capacity, making him an entangled expert.
Roel Coutinho: A Technical Spokesman
The hibernation of Coutinho lasted until 2000, when after more than 20 years at the
public health division of the Amsterdam GGD, Coutinho became scientiﬁc director
of the entire institute. In his new position his role as expert changed. HIV/Aids was
still on his agenda, as were venereal diseases in general, but as the second crisis
called for experts to master a wide array of human and veterinary infectious agents,
he also had to inform the public on a broad portfolio of diseases. The number of
public appearances increased dramatically, and he once again became a familiar
ﬁgure in the newspapers.
14 This increasing diversity of topics was welcomed, but it
also implied challenges, as he now had to keep track of all kinds of developments
and topics that went beyond his original expertise (Coutinho 25 July 2008).
How did he cope with this? In really complex cases, Coutinho says, he referred
the journalist to a knowledgeable colleague. But in most other cases, Coutinho did it
himself. He read up on the subject matter, called a few people, and then appeared in
the media to comment or inform. The major challenge was to decide when he felt
knowledgeable enough not to consult others. We note that this back region
(Goffman 1959), the preparation, remains invisible to the public view; that which is
visible in the front region is the knowledgeable expert, who then takes the credit.
14 Between 1992 and 2000 LexisNexis reports 21 articles for Coutinho; between 2000 and 2008, an equal
time frame, there were 96.
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institute, and translating the specialist expertise residing there to public or political
contexts (Coutinho 13 May 2008). There are a number of reasons to do so. First of
all, he believes that it is part of his responsibility to carry the risks involved here.
Secondly, he is the experienced expert, aware of the intricacies of communication.
Thirdly, he enjoys communicating with the media, and this is stimulated by the
many successes he has experienced (Coutinho 13 May 2008). Consequently, he is
again a familiar face in the media. As the topics have become far less controversial
and political than they were during the 1980s, the contributions to policy and to the
public sphere are also more technical (determining risks, developing preparedness
plans). This makes him a technical spokesman.
Jaap Goudsmit: The Puritan
In the fourth stage we see several changes affecting Goudsmit’s expert role. During
the mid 1990s, he held a full professorship at the Amsterdam Medical Centre, and
the IAVI was a side project. After 2002 the balance started to shift. He moved to
biotech ﬁrm Crucell in 2002, where he is now director of research and member of
the board. He ended his board membership of the IAVI in 2004, and he swapped his
full professorship for an honorary one.
In addition to the professional changes, as a virologist he became more cautious
and reserved regarding what he knew. From studying his narrative, we see that
‘taking control’, that lesson from the 1980s and 1990s, is accomplished at two
levels: on the communicative level by knowing when to stop talking, and on the
strategic level by choosing the right battleﬁelds. It is his habit of selecting the more
regulated battleﬁelds that is a very distinct feature of his expert career after the mid-
1990s (Goudsmit 2 April 2008). He chooses spaces he feels comfortable and secure
in, spaces that respect the strict boundaries of his expertise. Although these factors
are important in understanding why Goudsmit takes up a certain role, in practice the
different constituents are difﬁcult to discern.
Two loci where he prefers to act are the courtroom and the study, writing popular
science books. In a long laudation on his experiences as a courtroom expert,
15 he
describes it as the site where expertise is used in the ‘purest way possible’ outside of
science, where all agendas lie open and only the expert’s knowledge is questioned.
The courtroom enhances the separation of facts and their interpretation; the juridical
boundaries create a regulated environment, which is appreciated by Goudsmit
(Goudsmit 2 April 2008).
Another preferred site for showing his expertise is his writing desk, where he is in
charge of the content and form. Since the turning point in his expert biography in the
mid-1990s, a steady stream of popular science books has been published. He tries to
communicate technical knowledge to the public in the purest possible way, although
this has not been well received by either book reviewers or editors, who say his
15 It is not clear exactly how often he has been in court as an expert witness. Court case reports place him
in court between 2001 and 2007.
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(Goudsmit 19 May 2008; Trouw 17 June 2000, 1 March 2003).
Next to these ‘battleﬁelds’ that are cherished for their safety, Goudsmit avoids
policymaking, for he loathes the conﬂicts of interest and the consensus ﬁnding. He
has developed a love of purity in expertise that excludes policy rooms. Because of
his love of purity, the preference for a clear expert role and the resulting choices, we
refer to him as the puritan.
Stage 5: 2003–April 2009: Anticipating Future Crises
Pushing Through the Fifth Stage: Concerted Action for Control
Following years of a pandemic warning, the rapid spread of SARS, and numerous
actual or possible outbreaks, politicians in the Netherlands were well aware that the
lack of political responsibility, coordination, and strategic planning for outbreaks
needed to be addressed. Furthermore, in 2003 a veterinarian died after being
infected with bird ﬂu.
16 This focusing event (Birkland 1997) triggered the shift to
the ﬁfth stage, during which there were endeavours to increase control over the viral
threats. What is remarkable about this shift is that although the virologists occupied
different positions and held different views on the science-policy-public nexus, they
pushed it through collectively.
Goudsmit chose to write an open letter to a Dutch newspaper with the
provocative title ‘The Netherlands are unprepared for a viral attack’. The message
was that the government was failing to take responsibility for the control of
epidemics and public communication; people like Osterhaus were doing what the
government should have been doing (NRC Handelsblad 5 July 2003). The
Director-General of the Ministry of Public Health replied, in which he
acknowledged part of the critique (NRC Handelsblad 17 July 2003). Osterhaus
and Coutinho also campaigned for a new infectious disease infrastructure, referring
to SARS and avian ﬂu as the wake-up calls. Osterhaus continued his alarming
predictions of a pandemic, and even Coutinho made dramatic statements to create
awareness (Volkskrant 5 June 2003), which is contrary to his factitious style of
communicating. It was, in his words, steering between the Scylla of a failing
outbreak management and the Charybdis of creating a panic (Coutinho 25 July
2008).
The collective efforts proved effective: in the course of 2004, a decision was
taken to install the Centre for Infectious Disease Control (CIDC) at the RIVM, a
centre that, under political accountability, would coordinate outbreaks of infectious
diseases and handle public communication (Ministry of Health 7 December 2004).
This new instrument for control embodies the ﬁfth stage.
16 There was even a television documentary made about the death of the vet, featuring both Goudsmit
and Osterhaus. Zembla, 2 October 2003.
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When the government planned the CIDC in 2004, Osterhaus was ofﬁcially
consulted regarding these plans and asked to stand as candidate director. Alarmed
by the fact that the government would set up the centre without proper consultation
with the Health Council, Osterhaus informed them of this and suggested a
consulting committee. The next step was the selection of a director. Osterhaus
turned the offer down, as he had had his share of the RIVM in the past. In his view,
the only other person capable of the job was Coutinho, and Osterhaus personally
phoned him (Osterhaus 29 July 2008); Coutinho accepted. Again, Osterhaus was
tying a policy process and its outcome together by using formal and informal
relations and his credibility in policy; this, again, took place in the back region.
The implication of the CIDC was that the political complexity surrounding
Osterhaus was temporarily resolved, and that there was a government voice for
public communication. Meanwhile, Osterhaus’ campaign for more pandemic
vigilance continued. Starting in 1997, major steps were taken in this direction, such
as the national storage of antiviral drugs (Gezondheidsraad 2005).
Osterhaus’ role in avian ﬂu and in the successes regarding SARS resulted in a
dramatic increase in public, political and scientiﬁc credibility. Through his countless
media appearances he gained the status of a public ﬁgure, and some even call him
‘the David Beckham of virology’ (Volkskrant 10 February 2009). He seems to be an
invincible expert, not just because of this increase in credibility, but also because the
risks of entanglement had been resolved. But as the H1N1 pandemic demonstrated,
‘David Beckhams’ are particularly prone to loss of credibility; there was great
upheaval with regard to Osterhaus’ commercial, scientiﬁc and political interests
(Enserink 2009).
Roel Coutinho: Directing a New Boundary Organisation
Coutinho has been director of the CIDC since January 2005 and his main
responsibility has been to set up a new control structure for infectious diseases.
Zoonoses are by far the greatest threat, and there is considerable conﬂict between
the interests of agriculture (a melting pot for infectious agents) and of public health.
Notorious cases are MRSA and Q fever bacteria (Coutinho 25 July 2008). Coutinho
is caught in the middle of both ministries, and acts as a kind of buffer. Whenever
there is an outbreak, Coutinho and his centre are on top of it, with regard both to
outbreak management and to public communication. The CIDC has the data, the
expertise and the responsibility to do so. He is still a spokesman and translator, but
now under ministerial responsibility.
Coutinho’s role has led to a dispute between Coutinho and Osterhaus. Coutinho
describes himself as an expert who is independent of the institutional setting and
always does what he believes in. Osterhaus, however, depicts Coutinho as a
governmental expert, since he falls under direct responsibility of the health minister.
Osterhaus recounts how he has seen Coutinho change over the years, becoming less
outspoken, and says that his political accountability has contributed to this
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pressures, he says it has not changed him; he is not the governmental representative
Osterhaus claims he is. He is less outspoken, since there is no need for him to act
otherwise (Coutinho 13 May 2008).
The debate of his role is illustrative for the embedding of the CIDC as a new
‘boundary object’ in the Dutch institutional landscape, combining science, policy
and communication in a novel way.
Jaap Goudsmit: Hobby Expert
Following his interventions in infectious disease control in 2003, Goudsmit repeated
the same strategy in 2004. In the same form and in the same newspaper, he
castigated the Dutch education policy and pleaded for a dual university system
(NRC Handelsblad 10 June 2004). This was not based on his expertise as a
virologist, but on his experience in academia and in industry. Again, this letter
evoked much response, some of it critical, and a documentary (Tegenlicht 5
February 2006) and book essay followed (Goudsmit 2006).
In addition to this interest in education, he is still writing popular science books
on virology. This is probably the only topic in which he still publicly discusses his
expertise in virology. He is constantly experimenting with form, and in his present
book he is again trying to communicate pure knowledge, which remains difﬁcult.
The resulting book is Dromen van vaccines (‘Dreaming of vaccines’, Goudsmit
2009).
The puritan expert keeps the hubris on a leash, and Goudsmit is very selective in
his expert dealings. He nevertheless displays what he calls his ‘hobbies’ (Goudsmit
2 April 2008): writing novels and sharing his views on issues he feels
knowledgeable about. This combination of a strict expert acting within virology
and a hobbyist outside of virology leads to the role of hobby expert.
Conclusion: On Opening Up the Biographical Black Box
This article has studied from a biographical-narrative perspective how Albert
Osterhaus, Roel Coutinho and Jaap Goudsmit positioned themselves over the years
as policy and public experts in the ﬁeld of infectious diseases. Their narratives
covered ﬁve stages, from the late 1970s until April 2009, when the swine ﬂu
pandemic struck. Right from the start, they were all simultaneously conducting
research, drafting public health or veterinary policy based on that research, and
communicating to various publics and patient groups on the diseases. In some cases,
communication was used strategically to induce policy change (Birkland 1997;
Kingdon 1995), but often enough communication was aimed at solely informing the
public on the status quo of outbreaks.
Of the various elements of the experts’ biographies, two aspects stand out from
the rest: the personal reﬂections of these experts on their roles; and the tandem
development of governance arrangements and the role of these virologists therein.
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error methods of ‘being an expert’ steadfastly developed into more crystallised
views on their roles. The experts based their methods on the early-career
understandings of the relationship between science, politics and the public domain.
This article opens up the biographical-narrative ‘black box’ of these experts, and the
enactment of that biography in practice (Goffman 1959; Deuten and Rip 2000;
Brockmeier and Carbaugh 2001). Learning experiences, personal or communal
reﬂections on speciﬁc events, the continuous process of re-narrating and reframing
past experiences, all added up to an individual conviction on ‘how to perform as a
credible expert’. In Coutinho’s case, we might say that his self-perception as an
expert has not changed dramatically, but solidiﬁed in a repertoire of communicating
the facts. Goudsmit, on the other hand, following a redeﬁnition of his expertise,
radically changed the way in which perceived his role in policy and in public debate.
Then we have Osterhaus, who still ﬁnds himself in a continuous balancing act
between a credible scientist, a policy entrepreneur, a public communicator and an
industry advisor. The biographical-narrative approach has elucidated how each of
them have accommodated themselves in the boundary zone between science, policy
and public debate, and thus juxtaposes with a more macro-sociological understand-
ing of expertise, such as Nowotny’s ‘narrative of expertise’ (Nowotny 2000).
The second aspect that stands out is the development of governance arrange-
ments. The studies of Coutinho and Osterhaus demonstrate that since they were
pioneers in the development of new governance arrangements, they remained
central ﬁgures in these arrangements for infectious disease control. The emerging
governance structures and the pioneering virologists remained tied together. It is no
accident that when the CIDC was being set up, Osterhaus and Coutinho were the
prime, if not only, candidate directors. Up until the H1N1 pandemic, these two
virologists were the key ﬁgures in policymaking and public debate. In cases where
new governance arrangements emerge, we can thus expect the leading ﬁgures in that
process to remain tied to those arrangements. It is certainly relevant to scrutinise
the degree in which the experts themselves strive to remain tied, whether the
arrangements as such keep them tied, and why. This article demonstrates how the
involvement of certain ﬁgures is understandable from a historical and biographical
perspective.
However, with shifting challenges and changing social, economic and political
contexts, it may be desirable to renew the composition of expertise in governance
arrangements. Without wishing to pass direct judgment on either Coutinho or
Osterhaus, I suggest that biographical ties should not grant access by default.
Probing these dimensions, as this study does, assists in the assessment of the nature
and structure of contemporary governance arrangements, the persons involved and
their relationships to science, politics and the public sphere. Although this does not
provide a prescriptive approach to expertise, such as that suggested by Collins and
Evans (Collins and Evans 2007), it may help to critically question the almost
automatic policy involvement of some experts.
The recent H1N1 pandemic demonstrates that this problematisation is not merely
a scholarly exercise. From the ﬁrst announcements of the new virus, Osterhaus and
Coutinho dominated politics and the media. Their performances raised a plethora of
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2009). This led to the organisation of a public debate with Osterhaus and Coutinho,
inviting them to publicly reﬂect on their roles (see Dortmans and Van Rijswoud
2009).
A last and important conclusion of this case study is that during the recent
pandemic, the historically grown roles of Osterhaus and Coutinho did not resonate
with the changing ideas of various public domains on the roles of experts. As norms
and expectations for credibility and authority change over time, these experts cannot
rely on the crystallised understandings of their roles and their settled positions in
governance arrangements. During the course of the pandemic, for various reasons,
Osterhaus’ and Coutinho’s credibilities were severely damaged and their authorities
disputed. Osterhaus’ balancing act could not withstand the growing wave of
criticism (Enserink 2009), and Coutinho’s notion of medical authority was
challenged down to the bone (Coutinho 2 February 2010). These controversies
raise a call for a more thorough reﬂection on their roles, both within governance and
public communication. Answering that call, this article tells us, is a continuous
struggle and challenge.
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